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THE “GAPS” AND EXCESSES OF TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE IN TAIWAN—A RESPONSE TO CALDWELL 
Ian Rowen 
Abstract:   Ernest Caldwell’s legal history of transitional justice in Taiwan 
provides scholars a great service by periodizing and clearly summarizing key moments for 
the formulation and passage of relevant legislation. In so doing, however, it frames ongoing 
and perhaps ultimately unresolvable struggles over the meaning of history and the 
possibility of redress for past injustices as “gaps” within “Taiwan’s transitional justice 
experience,” belying a seemingly ahistorical conceptualization of transitional justice. The 
language of “gaps” suggests that transitional justice is a practice with a clearly defined and 
universally-accepted template, toolkit, and timeline, such that there is a commonly-
understood set of criteria by which one could objectively evaluate success or completion. 
In fact, scholars have convincingly shown transitional justice to be constituted by an 
extraordinarily malleable, diverse, open-ended, and often vaguely-defined set of legal and 
extra-legal instruments, discourses, and practices that are conducted by a variety of actors 
and in pursuit of an often-divergent variety of political projects.  
This brief argument is based less on the official actions of the Transitional Justice 
Commission itself, than on a widely-circulated unofficial statement signed by members of 
the Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee (Indigenous Justice 
Committee), which was established by a presidential directive. This statement was issued 
as response to a speech by China’s leader, Xi Jinping, who asserted that Taiwanese and 
Chinese people share cultural and blood ties, and that Taiwan belongs to China. Taiwan’s 
indigenous signees public letter began “Mr. Xi Jinping, you do not know us, so you do not 
know Taiwan.”1 My rejoinder here echoes this letter by suggesting that one cannot know 
about transitional justice in Taiwan without knowing more both about Taiwan’s 
relationship with China and its simultaneous imbrication and contradiction with indigenous 
identity and sovereignty.  
Cite as: Ian Rowen, The “Gaps” and Excesses of Transitional Justice in Taiwan—A 
Response to Caldwell, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 645 (2019). 
Ernest Caldwell’s legal history of transitional justice in Taiwan 
provides scholars a great service by periodizing and clearly summarizing key 
moments for the formulation and passage of relevant legislation.2 In so doing, 
however, it frames ongoing and perhaps ultimately unresolvable struggles 
 
  Ian Rowen is Assistant Professor in the School of Social Sciences at Nanyang Technological 
University, Singapore. 
1  See generally, Joint Declaration by the Representatives of the Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan serving 
on the Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF TAIWAN 
TO PRESIDENT XI JINPING OF CHINA, https://g0v.hackmd.io/s/SyKTh6bM4 (last visited Apr. 22, 2019) 
[hereinafter Joint Declaration]; For Xi’s January 2nd speech, see CCTV Video News Agency, LIVE: 40th 
Anniversary of Issuing "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”, YOUTUBE (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=not9jASVHds; for an analysis of Tsai’s response, see Chris Horton, 
Taiwan’s President, Defying Xi Jinping, Calls Unification Offer “Impossible”, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2019), 
http://nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/asia/taiwan-xi-jinping-tsai-ing-wen.html. 
2  Ernest Caldwell, Transitional Justice Legislation in Taiwan Before and During the Tsai 
Administration, 27 WASH. INT'L L.J. 449 (2018). 
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over the meaning of history and the possibility of redress for past injustices as 
“gaps” within “Taiwan’s transitional justice experience,” belying a seemingly 
ahistorical conceptualization of transitional justice. The language of “gaps” 
suggests that transitional justice is a practice with a clearly defined and 
universally-accepted template, toolkit, and timeline, such that there is a 
commonly-understood set of criteria by which one could objectively evaluate 
success or completion. In fact, scholars have convincingly shown transitional 
justice to be constituted by an extraordinarily malleable, diverse, open-ended, 
and often vaguely-defined set of legal and extra-legal instruments, discourses, 
and practices that are conducted by a variety of actors and in pursuit of an 
often-divergent variety of political projects.3  
Such an ahistorical analytic “gap” is spotlighted by the tightly-focused 
empirical scope of his article. Although Caldwell’s attention is importantly 
aimed at Taiwan’s domestic affairs, and specifically its legislative actions, my 
short reply here will further argue, in line with an earlier co-authored piece, 
that such a treatment would be complemented by greater attention to the wider 
geopolitical context in which President Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP)-majority legislature have crafted and framed their 
legal and political approaches to transitional justice.4 This context is, of course, 
the ineluctable irredentist military threat represented by the People’s Republic 
of China (China), which overshadows much of Taiwan’s political space, and 
the promise and peril of transitional justice-associated language and practice 
as potential resources for nation-building in a such a contested and multi-
cultural territory.  
My brief argument here will, perhaps counter-intuitively, use as its 
central example not the official actions of the Transitional Justice 
Commission itself, which was established via legislation, but a widely-
circulated unofficial statement signed by 26 of the 28 members of the 
Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee (Indigenous 
Justice Committee), which was established by a presidential directive. This 
statement was issued on January 8, 2019, in response to a speech by China’s 
 
3  For a fuller discussion based on multi-sited and comparative case studies, see JAMIE ROWEN, 
SEARCHING FOR TRUTH IN THE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2017); see generally Paul Gready & 
Simon Robins, Rethinking Civil Society and Transitional Justice: Lessons From Social Movements and ‘New’ 
Civil Society, 21 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 956 (2017) (analyzing the role of civil society in transitional justice 
projects). 
4  Ian Rowen & Jamie Rowen, Taiwan’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee: The Geopolitics of 
Transitional Justice in a Contested State, 11 INT. J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 92, 105 (2017). 
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leader, Xi Jinping, who asserted that Taiwanese and Chinese people share 
cultural and blood ties, and that Taiwan belongs to China. Taiwan’s 
indigenous signees public letter began “Mr. Xi Jinping, you do not know us, 
so you do not know Taiwan.” 5  My rejoinder here echoes this letter by 
suggesting that one cannot know about transitional justice in Taiwan without 
knowing more both about Taiwan’s relationship with China and its 
simultaneous imbrication and contradiction with indigenous identity and 
sovereignty.  
To build this argument, it is worth briefly recapping the domestic 
challenges faced by the transitional justice process to illustrate why both the 
indigenous and cross-Taiwan Strait contexts remain so relevant. Although 
Taiwan’s pursuit of transitional justice witnessed several major legal and 
political breakthroughs, including the passage of the 2016 Illicit Assets Act 
and the 2017 Transitional Justice Bill, as well as Tsai’s public apology to 
Taiwan’s indigenous people and creation of the Indigenous Justice Committee, 
its implementation has been highly contentious. This is not only due to 
partisan fractiousness and media criticism, but also the complications of 
coordinating multiple agencies, including the Ministry of Culture and even 
the Central Bank, which may be requested to issue currency scrubbed clean 
of images of the late authoritarian President Chiang Kai-shek.6  
The most serious transitional justice-related public relations crisis 
erupted in late 2017, when a Transitional Justice Commission staffer leaked 
an unauthorized recording of a private meeting during which then-Deputy 
Chairman Chang Tien-Chin flippantly suggested that the commission should 
“manipulate” public opinion against then-New Taipei City mayoral candidate, 
Hou You-yi, who Chang allegedly described as the “most despicable case [of 
concern] in transitional justice.”7 Hou had led the Taipei Police Department’s 
Criminal Investigative Division during the 1989 investigation of pro-
democracy publisher Nylon Deng, who self-immolated in his office as police 
massed outside his door. Deng has since been remembered as a martyr to 
Taiwan’s pro-democracy and pro-independence movements. Chang’s 
comments were roundly criticized both by media outlets as well as the DPP 
 
5  See Joint Declaration, supra note 1; for Xi’s speech, see CCTV Video News Agency, supra note 1; 
for an analysis of Tsai’s response, see Horton, supra note 1. 
6  Chen Yu-fu & William Hetherington, Currency Redesign Likely Cheaper than Speculated, TAIPEI 
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2018), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/12/27/2003706855. 
7  Stacy Hsu, Deputy Chairman Resigns From Transitional Justice, TAIPEI TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), 
http://taipeitimes.com/News/front/print/2018/09/13/2003700317. 
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leadership, including then-Premier William Lai. Not only Chang, but four of 
the five members present in the meeting soon stepped down, as did 
Commission chairman Huang Huang-hsiung.8 Hou went on to handily win his 
election and said that if history repeated itself with the same conditions, he 
would have conducted his investigation the same way.9 
The decision to simultaneously pursue two distinct institutional 
tracks—one general “Transitional Justice Commission” to address post-1945 
injustices, and one aimed at indigenous issues, “The Presidential Indigenous 
Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee,” with no specific 
temporal bounds, will likely be remembered as one of the Tsai administration 
and DPP leadership’s most consequential choices for its approach to 
transitional justice. As Caldwell cogently notes, the legislative bills only cover 
the era of Kuomintang (KMT) rule of the Republic of China over Taiwan, and 
thereby do not directly address the injustices committed during earlier 
colonial periods, during which Japanese and Qing rulers had seized 
indigenous lands that eventually passed into the hands of the KMT and its 
business partners. The choice of time period, therefore, limited the possibility 
of long-sought measures of redress for Taiwan’s indigenous people for both 
KMT and pre-KMT era violations. However, rather than pursue remedies in 
the legislature, where eventual passage of any more transitional justice bills 
still remained in question, Tsai opted instead on August 1, 2016 to deliver a 
public apology to Taiwan’s indigenous people for “four centuries of pain and 
mistreatment,” and to issue “Guidelines for Establishment of the Presidential 
Office Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee” 
(Indigenous Justice Commission).10  Although such a high-profile apology 
was an unprecedented step for a Taiwanese leader to take, and scholars such 
as Scott Simon have argued that Tsai’s approach to “natural sovereignty” was 
“consistent with the spirit of both the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Taiwan’s own Basic Law on Indigenous 
Peoples,” her later response to indigenous demands for land rights was 
 
8  Id. 
9  Luo Yizhi (羅暐智), ‘Zhua Zheng Nanrong wenxin wukui tan dangdang!’ Houyouyi: Yifa xingshi, 
zai lai yici haishi yao zhixin  (「抓鄭南榕問心無愧坦蕩蕩！」侯友宜：依法行事，再來一次還是要執
行) [“Catch Zheng Nanxuan's innocence and frankness! ” Hou Youyi: Acting according to law, once again, 
still have to perform], STORM MEDIA (Sept. 14, 2018, 8:20AM), https://www.storm.mg/article/495509. 
10  Ing-wen Tsai, Full text of President Tsai Ing­wen’s Apology to Indigenous People, FOCUS TAIWAN 
(Aug. 1, 2016), http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201608010026.aspx.  
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protested by some prominent indigenous activists who had previously 
supported her.11 
The role of indigeneity in the forging of contemporary Taiwan’s 
cultural and political consciousness is too complex to be fully addressed in 
this brief treatment. Needless to say, it is driven both by the rich cultural 
diversity and social disparity within Taiwan, as well as by the instrumentality 
of discourses of indigeneity for the performance of national difference from 
China and from Chinese (or Han Taiwanese) people as an imagined 
community. Not only have self- or state-identified indigenous peoples staked 
political claims on their ethnic identities, but discourses of indigeneity have 
also been used by independence activists and even the campaigns and 
administration of past-DPP Chair and President Chen Shui-bian, among 
others, to assert notions of “inherent sovereignty” for Taiwan.12 The reframing 
of such persistent legal and political problems as those of “transitional justice” 
has affected and arguably accelerated these projects. 
Therefore, although the transitional justice legal process has been 
affected by partisan fractiousness and scandal, the communicative and 
informal institutional capacities of both the Truth and Reconciliation 
Committee (TRC) and the Indigenous Justice Commission have paid back 
other kinds of political dividends. These have not yet been manifested by, for 
example, a comprehensive rearticulation of indigenous land rights or formal 
moves towards self-rule, but rather in novel styles of national and 
international political performance. For example, on December 9, the TRC 
exonerated 1,505 people it deemed wrongly convicted of crimes during the 
authoritarian period. The performative effect of the exoneration was 
augmented by the commission’s conducting an indigenous Atayal ritual, 
attended by Vice President Chen Chien-jen, timed to coincide with the 70th 
Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 13  The 
choreography of this commemoration exemplified the ongoing convergence 
between discourses of indigeneity and international human rights norms that 
characterize Taiwan’s evolving approach to transitional justice.  
 
11  Scott Simon, The Roots of Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples Protests, TAIWAN INSIGHT (Oct. 9, 2017), 
https://taiwaninsight.org/2017/10/09/the-roots-of-taiwans-indigenous-peoples-protests/. 
12  Scott Simon, Paths to Autonomy: Aboriginality and the Nation in Taiwan, in THE MARGINS OF 
BECOMING: IDENTITY AND CULTURE IN TAIWAN 221, 239 (Carsten Storm & Mark Harrison eds., 2007), 
http://faculty.washington.edu/stevehar/Simon paths to autonomy.pdf. 
13  Chen Yu-fu, Commission Exonerates 1,505 People, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/12/10/2003705830. 
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Such a convergence was made even more manifest following the 
January 2019 speech by Xi Jinping, which asserted that both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait belonged to the same Chinese nation, and that unification of 
Taiwan and Mainland China under a “One Country, Two Systems” 
framework, similar to that of Hong Kong, was a historical inevitability. This 
speech was widely panned in Taiwan’s public sphere. Tsai Ing-wen responded 
with a strongly-worded rejection of Xi’s claims, which were articulated 
through a normative commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law. Her speech saw her approval numbers rise dramatically, a striking 
turnaround after the DPP suffered humiliating losses in the December 2018 
city and county elections.14 
Importantly, transitional justice was articulated into this political shift 
not by the official TRC, but by an unofficial statement signed by 26 of the 28 
members of the Indigenous Justice Committee. Spearheaded by vice-
Chairman Pasuya Poiconx, also Dean of the College of Indigenous Studies at 
National Dong Hwa University, and members Mateli Sawawan and Lin Shu-
yao, Secretary-General of the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, it was 
completed in two days in a Facebook group discussion.15 The letter took aim 
at the governments of both Taiwan and China, although given its addressee, 
it was assuredly more critical of the latter:  
We are the indigenous peoples of Taiwan, and we’ve lived in 
Taiwan, our motherland, for more than 6,000 years. We are not 
the so-called “ethnic minorities” within the “Chinese nation”. 
The stories our ancestors tell . . . that Taiwan is — and has always 
been — the traditional territory of the indigenous peoples on this 
land. Taiwan is the sacred land where generations of our 
ancestors lived and protected with their lives. It doesn’t belong 
to China. We the indigenous peoples of Taiwan have witnessed 
the deeds and words of those who came to this island, including 
the Spanish, the Dutch, the Koxinga Kingdom, the Qing Empire, 
the Japanese, and the Republic of China. . . . We the indigenous 
peoples of Taiwan have pushed this nation forward towards 
respect for human rights, democracy, and freedom. After 
 
14 Chris Horton, Faced With Tough Words From China, Taiwan Rallies Around Its Leader, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/19/world/asia/china-taiwan-president.html. 
15  IPCF-TITV 原文會  原視 , 習近平一國兩制說  原轉會 :不退讓台灣主體性  2019-01-20 
Pinuyumayan IPCF-TITV 原 文 會  原 視 族 語 新 聞 , YOUTUBE (Jan. 20, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KsJW7rc3BWU.  
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thousands of years, we are still here. . . . The national future of 
Taiwan will be decided by self-determination of the Taiwanese 
indigenous peoples and all the people who live on our 
motherland. No government, political party, or organization has 
the right to negotiate with any foreign power in an attempt to 
surrender the control of the traditional territory of ours, the 
indigenous peoples of Taiwan. We have never given up our 
rightful claim to the sovereignty of Taiwan.16 
This letter is remarkable for a variety of reasons, including its claim 
that indigenous people were not only the sovereigns of Taiwan, but the 
nation’s standard-bearer for the struggle for “human rights, democracy, and 
freedom.” Although this was not an official statement of the Commission, it 
was signed by a large majority of its members, and several more signees were 
invited in order to include at least one representative from each of Taiwan’s 
recognized indigenous groups.17 It was also, according to Poinconx, aimed at 
multiple audiences in addition to Xi, in the hopes that “Taiwanese compatriots 
will also recognize our circumstances as indigenous people. We hope that this 
letter will really present what kinds of roles we play, in the past, and also in 
the present, and even in the future. I think that as the country faces such a big 
obstacle, we indigenous people must also make our voice heard.” 18  The 
statement appeared in Taiwan’s high-circulation daily newspaper and website, 
the Apple Daily, was translated into English by “g0v,” a civil tech social 
activist collective, and reported on by high-profile international media outlets, 
including the New York Times and Quartz, which seldom cover Taiwan’s 
indigenous people.   
In sum, while the conduct and eventual results of official commissions 
and committees remain crucial, what should be clear from the above account 
is that transitional justice discourse has already suffused domestic and 
international narratives of Taiwan as a nation, and of democracy and human 
rights within and beyond it. This underscores the important contribution of 
Caldwell’s scholarship. It also demonstrates the need for broader and deeper 
analysis of Taiwan’s case as a pioneer of transitional justice within Asia and 
as a potential model for other states, whether contested or not, that seek 
creative approaches to geopolitical and domestic public policy challenges.  
 
16   Joint Declaration, supra note 1. 
17  Interview with Juan Chun-Ta, Presidential Office Consultant (Jan. 20, 2018). 
18 . IPCF-TITV原文會 原視, supra note 15 (author translating and transcribing Poiconx’s statements).  
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